

Mongolia's Delicate Balancing Act

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As Mongolia has realigned its foreign policy in the past few years, its relationship with the United States has developed rapidly. The emphasis placed on this growing alliance is best evidenced by the recent string of high-level US visitors Mongolia has received. In 2005, US Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert, President George Bush accompanied by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Mongolia in succession in August, October and November. While meeting with Bush, Mongolia's Prime Minister stated that, "Mongolia considers the United States its third neighbor."

Along with the general warming in relations between the two countries, there has been a marked increase in military cooperation. When high-level American officials visit Mongolia, they almost always bring with them a great deal of military aid. In the 2001 fiscal year, the United States provided \$2 million in aid in the form of communications equipment for the Mongolian border patrol. At the time, this

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amount accounted for half of all American funds for military aid in Asia.¹ Through joint military exercises by the two countries, personnel training and military aid, the Mongolian military has improved its rapid response and joint operation abilities. The Mongolian army is also currently helping to train the Afghan militia's artillery units. In October of 2007, Mongolia deployed troops and engineers to Iraq for the eighth time and stated that they would "persist until the end alongside" the American military in Iraq.² This is in stark contrast to other US allies who have reduced troop numbers or have completely withdrawn soldiers from Iraq.

Following the deepening of US-Mongolian relations, Mongolia's international standing has increased correspondingly. Recently, the scales seem to have been tipped in favor of Mongolia's membership in the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). Also, at the beginning of 2005, Mongolia formally applied for membership in NATO's Partnership for Peace Program. Great Britain, France, Germany and other European countries have also actively cooperated with Mongolia on security matters.³

China has always regarded a stable border environment as an important condition for the nation's economic development. Therefore, anything that touches on security cooperation with Mongolia will inevitably be followed closely by China, regardless of whether it involves the United States or Russia. With the historical lessons from the Cold War era in mind, Beijing will not tolerate Mongolia once again becoming a "military base" used for threatening the security of the "three Norths" (North China, Northeast China and Northwest China). On this point, China and Russia's goals happen to be the same. Due to regional geo-strategic factors, Russia is also endlessly striving to get Mongolia to cast off the United States and its military influence.

CHINA'S STAKE IN MONGOLIA

China's 4,677 km border with Mongolia is a critical geo-strategic intersection. Towards the end of the Qing dynasty, the high-ranking official Zuo Zongtang once remarked that, "The integration of the Northwest links the arm with the fingers. Due to the importance of Xinjiang, protect Mongolia. Protect Mongolia to defend the capital."⁴ Indeed, even today a westward march from Mongolia could sever the connection between Xinjiang and China's interior; an eastward offensive could cut transportation between China's Northeast and the interior; and an overland assault on Beijing would be a straight shot of only 560 km. The terrain along this route is level and expansive, and thus convenient for a large attacking force. This path was used during the War of Resistance Against Japan by the Soviet-Mongolian joint forces as they entered China. It was also the main route for the former Soviet Union every time they undertook large-scale military maneuvers directed at China.

In addition to security considerations, resources and economic interests have also determined the important role that Mongolia plays in China's regional strategy. Mongolia has abundant natural resources, with coal reserves estimated at between 50 and 152 billion tons, as well as one of the ten largest copper molybdenum mines

in the world, the Erdenet mine. Currently, Sino-Mongolian bilateral ties are mostly concentrated in economic areas. China has invested more in Mongolia than any other nation each of the past ten years, and for the past nine years has been Mongolia's number one trading partner.⁵ The major recipients of China's investments have been the mining and energy industries. Following President Hu Jintao's visit to Mongolia in 2003, \$73.89 million (65.6 percent of China's investment in Mongolia in 2004) was concentrated on exploring and developing mineral deposits, replacing the food and beverage industry as the number one destination for Chinese investments. In 2005, Chinese investments in exploring and developing Mongolian mineral deposits increased to \$173 million, an increase of 134 percent over the previous year. This represented 74 percent of China's \$236 million of investments in Mongolia in 2005.⁶

The fact that China is a great consumer of resources and heavily reliant on imports plays a large role in its relationship with Mongolia. According to estimates, in 2020, if China does not strengthen its prospecting and change its mode of economic development, it will face a varying degree of shortages of 19 of its 45 most important mineral resources, 11 of those 19 being pillars of the national economy. Moreover, China will be reliant on external sources for 60 percent of its oil and 40 percent of its iron ore, while copper and potassium will remain at about 70 percent import dependent.⁷ This degree of reliance on foreign sources is quite high, and there is really only one geographical source for these energy resources. Looking at regional distribution, China's supply of energy resources is highly reliant on channels within the Indian Ocean. Presupposing that China's navy still will not completely possess operational abilities on the high seas, developing supplies of energy sources from neighboring countries is an important element of China's energy security strategy. Thanks to Mongolia's advantages of abundant mineral resources and convenient transport, it will undoubtedly play an important role in supplying China with energy resources. For example, oil exports from Russia's Siberian region could pass through Mongolia and enter China directly, and Mongolia's estimated 1.3 million tons of uranium reserves could be the solution to the bottleneck China is facing in its ambitious plans for increasing its nuclear power.

CHINESE NATIONALISM AND PAN MONGOLISM

Despite the increased cooperation between Mongolia and China thus far, there are lingering mutual suspicions that could impede the building of deeper ties. The unique historical relationship between China and Mongolia has brought about a "fearful" mentality in Mongolia regarding being reunified with China. Some sectors of Mongolian officialdom even go so far as to postulate that, "After China brings about unification with Taiwan, it's very possible that taking Mongolia back will be seen as the next step in the task of unifying the nation."⁸ Gao Shumao, formerly stationed at the Chinese embassy in Mongolia, stated that, "Chinggis Khan is yours and is also ours. Since we are all descendants of Chinggis Khan, we should develop

together.”⁹ Even though his comments stemmed from considerations regarding the attenuation of history, putting aside disputes and mutual development, they still resulted in the Mongolian media classifying him as a most unwelcome foreigner and his comments as expressing great-nation chauvinism.¹⁰ Meanwhile, some Chinese websites circulated the completely groundless “news” that “Mongolia demands to come back.” The appearance of this kind of news not only reflected feelings of Chinese nationalism, but also the general psyche of the Chinese people. Chinese culture is filled with some classic tenets of the thinking of an agricultural people, including the idea that land is the basis for the survival and development of the people. Therefore, the most difficult thing for Chinese people to accept is the break-up of their national territory. Thus, it is not difficult to understand their feelings of “longing” for the return of Mongolia after the return of Hong Kong and Macau.

On the Mongolian side of the border, the influence of “Pan Mongolism” – the desire to reunite with ethnic Mongolian areas of China and Russia – further complicates security relations with China. For Mongolians, the advent of the Cold War signified the division of their people by national boundaries. In the post-World War II era, the Soviet Union used Mongolia as a buffer against China and restrained its Pan Mongolism tendencies.¹¹ With the conclusion of the Cold War, external constraints on extra-territorial ambitions faded, and the rise of a national consciousness added fuel to the flames. In 1990, the Mongolia Democracy Party proposed the “unification of the three Mongolia’s” and appealed to the “descendants of Chinggis Khan” to strive for the establishment of “a greater Mongolian nation.” The scope of this “greater Mongolian nation” would include three republics of the Russian Federation, and in China, Inner Mongolia and the Autonomous Prefectures of Bortala and Bayingolin.¹² Those who ascribe to Pan Mongolism claim that, “No matter how many countries they live in, as long as there is a unified religion and unified written language, a people can naturally be linked together.”¹³

The nationalist movement in Mongolia relies mostly on the return of traditional culture, namely the worship of Chinggis Khan and religion. In the 1990’s, Mongolia went back to once again using Chinggis Khan’s nine white banners, and also fixed the date for the holding of the Chinggis Khan memorial ceremony, which the president, speaker, prime minister and others would attend. Thus, the religious worship of Chinggis Khan in Mongolia has once again been reestablished and put into practice, especially by the Mongolian military.¹⁴

Though Lamaism is the national religion of Mongolia, the collective memory of the Mongolian people is also based on the worship of Chinggis Khan. Within the nationalist movement to bring back traditional culture and religion in Mongolia, there are two key symbolic features: the worship of Chinggis Khan as an ancestral god and deified hero and his role as a protector of Buddhism.¹⁵ Thus, there are countless links between the world of Mongolian Buddhism, the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan independence movement. In Central Asia, the worship of Chinggis Khan is a kind of spiritual belief that is not bound by nations, languages or religions, and covers all

levels from the political domain to folk culture.¹⁶ All these factors combine to push forward the concept of a “great Mongolian nation.”

Pan Mongolism will make the situation involving the trends of separatism that already exist in Xinjiang and Tibet even more complex. This is the most severe challenge that the Pan Mongolism movement presents to China's future national security. Facing such a challenge, China has maintained a tough position from the start. During the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2002, the Dalai Lama visited Mongolia. In response, China not only put forth a diplomatic protest, it also suspended the Ulan Bator-Erlian Haote railway and issued a warning.¹⁷

POST-COLD WAR MONGOLIAN SECURITY STRATEGY

After the conclusion of the Cold War, Mongolia abandoned its foreign policy of “leaning” towards the Soviet Union, and instead established equidistant, friendly relations with Russia and China, and at the same time, strengthened its relations with the United States, Japan, the EU and other “third neighbors”. It thus began pursuing an equidistant, nonaligned foreign policy.¹⁸ Having said this, in the readjustment of its security strategy, Mongolia's relations with the United States have developed the most rapidly.

Mongolia's strengthening of its military cooperation with the United States was necessitated by the realities of its national security. During the Cold War, Mongolia was an “outpost” in the confrontation between the Soviet Union and China, and directly bore the brunt of security pressures from both the north and south. As Mongolia's strength was no match for China or Russia, it pursued a “multi-pillared” foreign policy after the Cold War ended. The essence of this policy was striving to form a balance between China and Russia while drawing in the United States, Japan and the EU in order to contain China and Russia and guarantee Mongolia's independence and security.

In addition to the generous amounts of equipment and funding Mongolia has received from the United States, the US military has also supplied aid in the form of personnel training. The US military has opened the Army War College and many other military schools and training organizations to the Mongolian military. Of all the military cooperation between Mongolia and the United States, the most eye-catching is the bilateral and multilateral joint military maneuvers co-organized by the two nations. As early as 1994, Mongolia and the United States began holding joint maneuvers. Over the next dozen years, the two countries held more than ten joint military maneuvers. In 2001, they held a humanitarian rescue exercise code-named “Balance Magic”. In 2003, Mongolia and the United States broke with their previous practice of small-scale military maneuvers, which had been limited in scope to rescue missions and mostly made up of civil defense troops, and agreed to hold large-scale “Kahn Quest” military maneuvers every summer in Mongolia. In 2006, the “Kahn Quest” maneuvers were expanded into a multinational joint military exer-

cise. More than a thousand soldiers from the seven nations of Mongolia, the United States, Bangladesh, India, Thailand, Tonga and Fiji participated. Compared to the previous maneuvers, other than the expanded scale, what merits attention is that the content was changed to coordinated warfare by regular army troops.¹⁹

Due to the limits of the Mongolian military's linguistic abilities and weaponry systems, many problems still exist concerning their desire to achieve complete coordination with the US military when undertaking joint actions.²⁰ In terms of equipment, the Mongolian military is almost entirely dependent on Soviet arms.²¹ Their current drive to transform their military into an American-style force in a short period of time could not possibly succeed on the first try, regardless of whether referring to expenditures, personnel training or ideas and conceptions. However, the Mongolian military's equipment system has already begun to change, and this will inevitably bring about the transformation of its construction, ideas on warfare and even military strategies.

Of course, US-Mongolian military cooperation is also constrained by China and Russia. Since Mongolia is completely encircled by China and Russia, its traffic and communication with the outside world must pass through one of the two countries. If China or Russia refuses to open up airspace or seaports to Mongolia, then its multinational joint exercises with other countries and the successful arrival of the related personnel and equipment would be cut off. The main foundation of Mongolia's external economy also lies in good relations with China and Russia because the trade costs associated with Mongolia's use of Chinese and Russian railways and highways depend on the corresponding preferential rights bestowed by these two great powers. Thus, due to its geo-strategic importance, Mongolia has already become the object of a multinational power struggle between the United States, Russia, China, Japan, Korea, the EU and others. In addition to striving to merge with the West, Mongolia currently still has two possible choices: first, relying once again on its traditional ally, Russia; second, strengthening its strategic links with China.

A "WEDGE" BETWEEN CHINA AND RUSSIA

The continuously deepening military cooperation between the United States and Mongolia has already drawn China's attention. Within Chinese academic circles, it is universally believed that the strengthening military cooperation between the United States and Mongolia is due to the value the United States places on the natural advantages of Mongolia's regional location, and its intention to drive a "wedge" between China and Russia. The strengthening of America's military presence in Mongolia constitutes both a real and latent challenge to China's national security.²² This is partly due to the fact that with Mongolia as a base, the United States has taken a step forward in exporting "democratic values" to Asia.²³

Meanwhile, Russia has taken the initiative in restoring relations with Mongolia, strengthening cooperation in the political and security realms. Moscow's goal is

quite clear: to persuade Mongolia to cast off America's military influence in order to guarantee both the Siberian region's security and Russia's influence on Central Asian countries. Russia's return to Mongolia is also, to a great extent, due to geo-strategic considerations. With the eastward expansion of the EU and NATO, Russia's strategic space in Central Asia is continuously being nibbled away. If Mongolia falls completely under the influence of the United States or China, the strategic situation for Russia on the Eurasian continent would present a dilemma with no easy solutions. According to one Russian media source, "With China developing so fast, Russia, which formerly had a special relationship with Mongolia, should not lose out on this protective screen and former ally which can be used as a card in containing China."²⁴

Mongolia's heavy reliance on the Soviet Union during the Cold war and the historical memories it produced will naturally be advantageous as Russia returns to Mongolia. In November of 2000, President Putin visited Mongolia and agreed to provide aid for the training of Mongolian military specialists in addition to launching military cooperation in other areas. At the same time, an agreement to help build a Mongolian nuclear power plant was signed. In April of the following year, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov declared that Moscow was preparing to help Mongolia upgrade their defense systems and troop training. In 2006, while the two sides were restoring and developing their conventional bilateral ties in the economic realm, they were also working hard to expand their cooperation into new territory.²⁶ In 2008, Mongolian President Enkhbayar visited Russia and expressed his hope for Mongolia to cooperate with Russia on uranium production and enrichment as well as on the construction of small-scale nuclear plants. He also pointed out that Russia was not a competitive adversary in those areas.²⁶ In November of that year, Russia and Mongolia held their first joint military maneuvers since the fall of the Soviet Union. Russia took on the entire cost of the maneuvers, and also provided 3 billion Tugriks (about \$26 million) in funds in order to supply the Mongolian army with replacement parts for weapons and military repair facilities.

Against the backdrop of the United States and Russia's unresolved chess game over the deployment of anti-missile systems in Eastern Europe, it is very possible that Mongolia will become a new regional battlefield in the political wrestling between the two. Since its independence, Mongolia has had little experience with multilateral diplomacy, let alone a tradition of multilateral diplomacy. Thus, there are reasons to doubt whether it possesses the diplomatic wisdom necessary to maneuver among various great powers. If Mongolia fails to balance its multiple foreign relations appropriately, its security environment will be even worse than during the Cold War. Mongolia will become a pile-up at the intersection of three unequal trilateral relationships. The wrestling between the United States and Russia in Mongolia will imperceptibly put pressure directly on China's national security. At the same time, it will have a negative effect on the stability and security throughout the region.

TOO CLOSE TO HOME

A neutral Mongolia is in the best interests of China and the future security situation in East Asia. Beijing will definitely not tolerate Mongolia once again becoming a “military base” used to threaten the security of the “three Norths”. Its sensitivity to foreign influence in Mongolia is particularly acute because it could potentially relate to China’s core national interest, Taiwan. During a Taiwan-related crisis, if by “coincidence” there was a challenge or friction from the direction of Mongolia, this would undoubtedly limit Beijing’s strategic options. Moreover, the security interests of the United States and China are already in close contact on the Pacific’s western coast. If the American military presence in Mongolia becomes too influential, from China’s point of view, it essentially means being encircled by the United States. Although Beijing has not directly publicized its stance on military cooperation between Mongolia and the United States, Russia and other countries, there still exists a relatively clear “red line”, namely that the current composition of Northeast Asian security cannot be dismantled, and even more, the situation cannot take a turn in a direction that is detrimental to China.

Mongolia seems to be sensitive to Beijing’s concerns, and as a result, after the US president visited Mongolia, the Mongolian president immediately paid a visit to China. During the trip, a joint communiqué was released stating that both sides agreed not to enter into any military or political alliances directed at the other.²⁷ The two nations’ cooperation and exchange on security and defense are also progressing step by step. Since 2004, China and Mongolia have conducted three consultations on security and defense.²⁸ These exchanges have been helpful in increasing understanding between the two sides, raising the level of trust and at the same time strengthening China’s influence in Mongolia. A neutral Mongolia truly fits with China’s security interests. First, if Mongolia were to choose between China, Russia and the United States, it would definitely create security pressures on the other two nations. A neutral Mongolia is undoubtedly beneficial to the stability of China’s peripheral security environment, especially in the “three Norths” region and the capital. Furthermore, friendly and stable relations between China and Mongolia would benefit the security of China’s supply of energy resources and also be beneficial in handling the domestic issue of ethnic separatism.

POTENTIAL PROGRESS, PITFALLS

The rapid development of Sino-Mongolian economic ties in recent years does not mean that bilateral relations are free of troubles, as many unfavorable factors exist. If they are handled incorrectly, it could lead to a chain reaction that would affect the stability and security of the region. Thus, great attention should be paid to the fact that the prospects for Sino-Mongolian relations depend to a large degree on the two countries’ perceptions and positioning regarding the other.

Referring to historical cultural traditions, the Mongolian and Chinese nations are classic examples of a nomadic people and an agricultural people. Throughout his-

tory, economically unstable nomadic peoples survived by launching wars against agricultural peoples. Thus, war was the basis of their historical contact, and nomadic peoples' hostility towards peasant peoples is rooted in long-standing cultural traditions. With this in mind, it is not difficult for us to understand the Mongolian people's apprehension and antipathy towards China's economic investments in Mongolia in recent years.

Although historically nomadic, Mongolia is now a democratic nation, and the interactions between the political elite and the masses in the political realm follow the traditional democratic model. Thus, if the people of Mongolia view China with universal hostility, it could be taken advantage of by politicians in Mongolia as personal capital in their political maneuvering and campaigning. In office, these politicians would undoubtedly influence bilateral relations at the official level. As the scope of Sino-Mongolian trade continuously expands to an ever-deepening level, it will undoubtedly not only deepen the level of this official contact, but also the level of mutual reliance. However, the degree of asymmetry in that mutual reliance may be one source of Mongolia's negative perceptions of China. Therefore, if China can focus on the principle of mutual benefit and allow the Mongolian government and people to enjoy the results of the development of Sino-Mongolian trade in an equitable manner, it would be beneficial in bringing about an overall improvement of Mongolia's perception of China at all levels of society.

In addition, China must place great importance on its public diplomacy towards Mongolia in order to further change Mongolia's perception of China. Altering negative perceptions, while also acknowledging and respecting cultural differences, should be the main diplomatic goal that guides China in its dealings with Mongolia. A Chinese foreign policy with this principle at its core would not only be beneficial for the development of bilateral relations and the promotion of China's economic interests in Mongolia, but would also be beneficial in collapsing the social base upon which Pan Mongolism rests.

It should also be noted that the Chinese nation is characterized by its "state of being a diversified whole" and is widely known for its pluralism and inclusiveness. Thus, in its Mongolia policy, China should actively employ its cultural advantages and win the Mongolian people's respect and understanding through its cultural pluralism and inclusiveness. In one example of effective cultural diplomacy, while developing the mining industry in Mongolia, Chinese firms have taken the initiative in becoming part of local society. They have participated in and strengthened environmental protection as well as post-development environmental restoration. This has certainly helped improve the image of Chinese companies and even the image of China as a nation.

In dealing with Mongolia, Chinese leaders should remember that, "All wars are started by nations, but the origins ferment within the masses."²⁹ In responding to the factors in the return of Mongolian nationalism and its melding with calls for

ethnic division, if China stubbornly responds in an unyielding manner, it will be treating the symptoms and not the disease and will be counterproductive. If, while maintaining a principled stance, China uses more flexible methods, increases the power of its cultural diplomacy, changes Mongolia's perception of China and causes the Mongolian people's suspicion towards China to disappear, then it will not be difficult to reduce the influence of Pan Mongolism among the masses and make the challenges to China's national security melt away. This will be the important content of the task ahead for China's cultural diplomacy toward Mongolia.

In view of Mongolia's "omni-directional, equidistant, multi-pillared" diplomatic principles as well as the reality that the United States, Japan, Russia and many other countries are all actively developing their relations with Mongolia, if China is too eager to establish itself as the dominant figure in Mongolia in the short-term, it will likely lead to suspicion and fear from Mongolians and will fundamentally endanger the diplomatic principles of dispelling doubt and increasing trust and cause unnecessary diplomatic friction with other nations. Thus, China's thinking should be based on long-term principles involving the improvement of China's image in Mongolia as well as coordination with other great powers to stabilize the regional structure of Northeast Asia.

THE COOPERATION OF GREAT POWERS

While "Pan Mongolism" brings with it a threat to China's national security, it also provides an opportunity for cooperation between China and Russia. Both nations have concerns related to ethnic separatist movements, have a common understanding regarding striking against these forces and are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which is aimed at, "Working together to strike against all forms of terrorism, separatism, and extremism." Thus, when faced with issues related to the terrorist and ethnic separatist movements that Pan Mongolism has given rise to, there is more than enough subject matter for a cooperative platform. Also, Mongolia has observer status within the SCO, so China and Russia can use the organization to increase their influence over it.

Efforts to establish a nuclear-free zone in Mongolia have provided a platform for greater cooperation and dialogue between the United States, China and Russia. In September 1992, Mongolian President Ochirbat declared Mongolia to be a nuclear free zone (the first country to ever do so) at the 47th UN General Assembly, and this pledge was guaranteed by the great powers. After a series of difficult negotiations, during a meeting of the first committee of the 55th UN General Assembly in November of 2000, the five great nuclear powers of China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States released a joint statement reaffirming their cooperation with Mongolia on the implementation of the UN resolution. The statement reiterated that the five countries would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Mongolia. The status of Mongolia's nuclear-free zone and its institutionalization still have a long ways to go, but in regard to Northeast Asian security, it is a

significant positive development and relevant to the resolution of the North Korea nuclear issue.

The establishment of Mongolia's status as a nuclear-free zone has led to some positives which can be utilized in the Six Party Talks. Although the security environment and national conditions of Mongolia and North Korea are very different, how to uphold their sovereignty and security in an environment made up of great powers is a pursuit common to both. North Korea continues to pursue nuclear weapons and a delivery system with the basic goal of defending its national security. Mongolia has gone down the opposite path by taking the initiative in renouncing nuclear weapons, and thus has similarly achieved the goal of safeguarding its national security. If China, the United States and Russia cooperate on this issue by promptly establishing the lawful status and institutionalization of Mongolia's nuclear-free zone and support its peaceful use of nuclear energy, they could provide a model for North Korea to ultimately "abandon nukes".

If handled properly, Mongolia can serve as an important strategic buffer for China in its dealings with the United States and Russia, much as North Korea has done in the past. However, only when a buffer state maintains its "elasticity" can it play a positive role in great power competition as it "stretches" in different directions to accommodate competing interests. Therefore, in the interest of its peripheral security environment, China should seize opportunities to keep Mongolia in play by mitigating great power competition. Cooperative initiatives such as the nuclear-free zone will help diffuse rivalry between the great powers. Meanwhile, a dialog with Mongolia based on cultural pluralism and respect will help to dispel mutual suspicions and will promote stability and trust between the two neighbors. All of this will not only improve China's national security in coming years, but will also enhance its status as a responsible and trustworthy power in East Asia. ☪

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NOTES

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¹⁶ Zhong Han [钟焱], “略论中亚突厥系民族对成吉思汗的崇拜” [A Brief Discussion of Chinggis Khan Worship by Central Asian Turks], in 世界民族 [World Nationalities], No. 5, 2006.

¹⁷ Hai Zhongxiong [海中雄], “达赖喇嘛访蒙古引起中蒙外交危机事件简析” [A Brief Analysis of the Diplomatic Crisis Caused by the Dalai Lama's Visit to Mongolia], in 蒙藏双月报 [Mongolia and Tibet Monthly], Vol. 11, No. 6, Nov, 2002.

¹⁸ 1994年6月30日, 蒙古大呼拉尔(议会)通过《蒙古国对外政策构想》和《蒙古国安全战略构想》, 指出“蒙古将实行开放的、不结盟、多支点的和平外交政策”, “吸引具有影响力的国家对蒙古在战略上的关注”, “提高本国的战略地位”, 提出“将主要依靠政治和外交手段来保障国家安全”的基本方针。蒙古对外政策的明确目标是: “均衡地同俄、中两大邻国发展睦邻友好关系, 并把同这两个国家发展互信、互利的友好合作关系作为外交的首要方针; 同时加强与美、日、欧盟等西方国家与国际组织的关系” [On June 30th, 1994, through “Conceptualizing Mongolia's Foreign Policy” and “Conceptualizing Mongolia's security strategy”, the Mongolian parliament pointed out that, “Mongolia would implement an open, non-aligned, multi-pillared peaceful foreign policy,” “attract the strategic attention of influential great powers,” “improve the country's strategic positioning” and the basic policy of “mostly relying on political and diplomatic measures to ensure national security.” Clearly, the goals of Mongolia's foreign policy are: “In a balanced manner, develop friendly relations with its two great neighbors, China and Russia, and make the development of mutual trust and mutual benefit in these friendly relations the guiding principle in foreign relations; at the same time, strengthen relations with the US, Japan, the EU, and other Western countries and international organizations], Mongolia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Concept of Mongolia's

Foreign Policy”, http://www.mfa.gov.mn/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=35&Itemid=46&lang=en.

¹⁹ Byambasuren Bayarmagnai. *Challenges Facing Mongolia's Participation in Coalition Military Operation*, Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, May 18, 2005.

²⁰ About 90% of the weaponry used by the Mongolian military was made in the former Soviet Union. Kyodo, “Russia Expresses Willingness to Help Mongolia with Military”, April 23, 2001, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0WDQ/is_2001_April_23/ai_73597758.

²¹ Wang Haixia [王海霞], “警惕美国打蒙古牌” [Guarding Against the US Playing the Mongolian Card], in *东北亚研究* [Northeast Asian Studies], No. 12, 2002; Li Dajun [李大军], “蒙古国‘多支点’外交政策及其对我周边安全环境的影响” [Mongolia's “Multi-Pillared” Foreign Policy and Its Influence on China's Peripheral Security Environment], in *东北亚论坛* [Northeast Asian Forum], No. 3, 2005; Nuo Lin [娜琳], “论蒙古国与美国的双边关系” [Discussing Mongolian-US Bilateral Ties], in *当代亚太* [Today's Asia Pacific], No. 2, 2007; Nuo Lin [娜琳], “蒙古与美国: 成为‘第三邻国’” [Mongolia and the US: Becoming the “Third Neighbor”], in *世界知识* [World Knowledge], No. 22, 2007; Zhong Guangyou [仲光友], “美蒙关系持续升温对我国安全战略的影响” [The Influence of Continuously Warming Relations Between the US and Mongolia on China's Security Strategy], in *东北亚研究* [Northeast Asian Studies], No. 1, 2008.

²² “颜色革命”之后, 中亚国家的执政力量对美国持保留态度, 因而美国在中亚的存在受到影响。蒙古的民主成果相对比中亚国家稳定, 这也成为吸引美国关注的一个因素。[After the “color revolutions”, those in power in Central Asia had reservations about the US, and thus, this influenced the state of the US presence in Central Asia. The results of Mongolia's democracy have been more stable than other Central Asian countries, and this has been a factor in drawing the attention of the US.]

²³ Wu Zaizheng [吴再政], “蒙古的安全战略与大国关系——解析蒙古国的中立外交路线” [Mongolia's Security Strategy and Relations with Great Powers – Analyzing Mongolia's Neutral Diplomatic Route], in *解放军外国语学院学报* [Liberation Army Foreign Language Institute Journal], No.3, 2002. 俄罗斯认为, “蒙古的中立和主权对俄罗斯来说是亚洲安全的一个重要因素, 一旦中国在蒙古占据了优势, 俄罗斯在远东的防御就要增加两倍, 而同远东的联系也将变得更加脆弱” [Russia feels that, “In Russia's view, Mongolia's neutrality and sovereignty are important factors in Asia's security. If China were to gain the upper hand in Mongolia, Russia's far eastern defenses would be doubled, and its links with the Far East would become more fragile”].

²⁴ Nuo Lin [娜琳], “蒙俄积极修复双边关系的背景分析” [Analyzing the Background of the Positive Restoration of Mongolian-Russian Bilateral Relations], in *当代亚太* [Today's Asia Pacific], No.12, 2002; Wu Zaizheng [吴再政], “蒙古的安全战略与大国关系——解析蒙古国的中立外交路线” [Mongolia's Security Strategy and Relations with Great Powers – Analyzing Mongolia's Neutral Diplomatic Route], in *解放军外国语学院学报* [Liberation Army Foreign Language Institute Journal], No. 3, 2007.

²⁵ Nuo Lin [娜琳], “蒙俄积极修复双边关系的背景分析” [Analyzing the Background of the Positive Restoration of Mongolian-Russian Bilateral Relations] in *当代亚太* [Today's Asia Pacific], No.12, 2002; BBC News, “Russia-Mongolia Military Deal”, April 20, 2001, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1287127.stm>.

²⁶ Ria Novosti, “Mongolian PM Reaffirms Interest in Russian-built Nuclear Plant”, May 27, 2008, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/russia/2008/russia-080527-rianovosti02.htm>.

²⁷ “中蒙发表联合声明不参加针对对方的军事联盟” [China and Mongolia Release Joint Statement Saying They Won't Join Any Military Alliances Directed at Each Other], in *联合报* [United], Nov 30, 2005, quoted from Wang Weifang [王维芳], “美中关系夹缝下的蒙古” [The Mongolian Crack in US-Sino Relations], in *蒙藏双月报* [Mongolia and Tibet Monthly], Vol. 15, No.1.

²⁸ “中国与蒙古将于今天开始进行首次防务安全磋商” [China Will Begin Defense Security Dialogue with Mongolia today], in 新华社 [Xinhua New Agency], April 26, 2004. See, <http://china.qianlong.com/4352/2004/04/26/1500@2022498.htm>

²⁹ 英国政治学学者菲利普·温莎语，引自入江昭著 [English Scholar cited by Jiang Zhaozhu], in 20世纪的战争与和平 [War and Peace in the Twentieth Century], 北京：世界知识出版社 [Beijing: World Knowledge Press], 2005, pg. 2.