

# Defensive Realism in the Indian Ocean: Oil, Sea Lanes and the Security Dilemma

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**A**s the Indian Ocean's role as a conduit of vital resources grows, so does the propensity for regional powers to exert their influence in this arena. This is particularly true for India and China, whose rising economies are dependent on the steady flow of imported resources, most importantly oil. In China, this is not just an issue of economic growth, but of the longevity of the Communist Party, which depends on economic growth to bolster its legitimacy and maintain domestic stability. As such, China's leaders have looked to strategies to ensure continued energy supplies, which depend on clear sea lanes of transportation in the Indian Ocean and transit points, such as the Strait of Malacca. Chinese leaders fear that adversaries could blockade sea lanes and strategic bottlenecks such as the Strait, thereby devastating China's economy.<sup>1</sup>

According to defensive realism, the only way to counteract such vulnerability is to pursue ambitious military and diplomatic strategies to increase security. In

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attempting to solve this dilemma, Chinese leaders have expanded the scope of the country's interests by modifying the concept of "active defense" and its tenet of "offshore defense."<sup>2</sup> This gradual transformation of offshore defense is embodied by the **extension of China's national interests in a growing and developing "security boundary"** comprising "distant ocean defense,"<sup>3</sup> along with the requisite naval modernization. In the eyes of India, which has similar concerns over energy supplies, China's actions appear to be a power maximization strategy that will inevitably impinge upon its interests. This may induce India to engage in similar behavior. A security dilemma may ensue in which a series of reactive security strategies destabilize relations between all major powers in the region.

### THE TENETS OF REALISM

Realism asserts that all nations act within an international system of anarchy. This absence of central authority or government is the cause of "enduring propensity for conflict between states."<sup>4</sup> The system is characterized by the belief in threat of force to compel certain behavior of nations. Power is sought, enhanced and expanded through arms and unilateralism. Realism sees an endless competition to ensure national survival.<sup>5</sup> Kenneth Waltz stipulates the critical tenets of survival as a constant preoccupation with the possibility of conflict, counteracting those threats and never letting one's guard down.<sup>6</sup> Deterrence, containment, power alliances and balance of power politics are the hallmarks of realism.<sup>7</sup> The importance of such aspects is magnified by geography and access to resources, which further complicate international relations. Indeed, nations are competitive actors pursuing their key national interests: national security and survival.

More recently realism has evolved into "an offensive and defensive branch."<sup>8</sup> According to defensive realism, nations gain power for self-preservation; in offensive realism states further increase their capabilities to project power.<sup>9</sup> Defensive realism predicts that when nations feel threatened they will pursue ambitious military, economic and diplomatic strategies to increase their security. When a defensive realist nation pursues such strategies, other nations often misconstrue them as threats of force leading to their own pursuit of similar strategies, further decreasing collective security. This type of mirroring can lead to a reciprocal cycle of action and reaction.<sup>10</sup> Thus, in the long run, strategies meant to buttress national security can **actually undermine it.**<sup>11</sup> According to offensive realism nations attempt to amplify their influence, particularly when they have the power to do so. Essentially the amplification of influence is "power maximization," or the idea that a nation will project its influence into any sphere that could increase its absolute power.<sup>12</sup> Similarly, Stephen Brooks explains that nations will constantly attempt to "advance their power over other nations, taking military advantage of weaker states whenever they have the chance."<sup>13</sup>


Acquiring power can cause increased insecurity among opposing nations. Even defensive realist strategies intended to increase state security often lead to a security dilemma, what Benjamin Friedman and Harvey Sapolsky refer to as "You Never

Knowism.”<sup>14</sup> Indeed, strategies meant to head off indefinite and unknown threats before they arrive may inadvertently lead to further instability.<sup>15</sup> This type of behavior influences many nations to believe that they “do not enjoy even an imperfect guarantee of their own security unless they set out to provide it for themselves.”<sup>16</sup> China’s evolving strategies to buttress its perceived insecurity reflect the paradox of the defense realism behavior. If China and its competitors repeatedly interpret each other’s defensive actions to be offensive in nature, a cycle of mirror reactions may ensue, continuously escalating tensions between them—potentially even to the point of conflict.

### FIGHTING FOR A PIECE OF THE PIE

While China’s economy is dependent on many imported resources, oil is a particularly strong motivator for the expansion of its defensive perimeter. China’s oil imports grew at an average rate of 9.1 percent annually from 1993 to 1998 and consumption reached 7.9 MBD (million barrels per day) in 2008.<sup>17</sup> The International Energy Agency projects a near doubling of imports to 15 MBD by 2020.<sup>18</sup> This spike in consumption is compounded by an 18 percent drop in the estimates of domestic reserves and further calculations of production decline from a high of 4 MBD by 2010, before gradually decreasing.<sup>19</sup>

*Oil Imports in MBD*<sup>20</sup>




To address the growing shortfall, China has stepped up imports and encouraged its national oil companies (NOCs) to seek concessions abroad, particularly in the Middle East, Africa and Central Asia. China’s 1994 “Westbound Strategy” called for economic and political expansion into resource rich regions to facilitate resource acquirement. Premier Li Peng’s 1997 “Policy on Energy Resources” expanded the “Westbound Strategy” by utilizing “any and all means including lobbying, financial aid and information exchange to achieve the broader goal of diversifying the sources

of China's energy supply."<sup>21</sup> Peng stated, "While striving to develop our own crude oil and natural gas resources, we have to use some foreign resources."<sup>22</sup>

Since 1994 imports have continued to rise. By 2007, Middle Eastern exports accounted for 78 percent of China's total imports and are expected to reach 80 percent by 2010.<sup>23</sup> Saudi Arabia has become the largest Middle Eastern oil exporter to China as well as the top oil exporter in total to China in 2005, 2007 and 2008. Meanwhile, Chinese NOCs have achieved mounting success in attaining contracts for oil field exploration and development, particularly in Africa,<sup>24</sup> but these shipments are also restricted to the same vulnerable sea lanes as incoming Middle Eastern oil. China seeks to repair that dilemma by pursuing a "security of supply."

*Growth of PRC oil imports from Middle East by percent<sup>25</sup>*



According to realism, however, the supply security that China seeks can only be attained with corresponding political and military power. Chinese leaders fear that as the country changes from "relative dependence to one of absolute dependence" upon imported oil, national security will be increasingly threatened.<sup>26</sup> Defensive realism predicts that when nations feel their security threatened they will pursue ambitious economic, diplomatic and military strategies. Indeed, much of the rhetoric on oil security in China seems to follow this line of reasoning. Zhang Yuncheng of the Beijing Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations explains simply, "Whoever controls the Strait of Malacca and the Indian Ocean could block China's oil transport route."<sup>27</sup> According to statements from President Hu Jintao, "certain major powers" have attempted to dominate the strait, which could constitute a major crisis for China.<sup>28</sup> According to PLA General Wen Zongren, an aspect of China's ambitious military strategy should entail development of a powerful "blue" water navy to "break out" of coastal waters to enable China's development.<sup>29</sup> A powerful navy will be able to enhance development by protecting sea lanes and ensur-

ing geographic access to oil-rich regions, including those with Chinese concessions.<sup>30</sup> This aim is increasingly a critical tenet of security, as explained by President Hu, who advocates a powerful navy to “uphold our maritime rights and interests.”<sup>31</sup> Whether or not those rights and interests include far-flung ocean passages is not clear; nonetheless, sea lane control could become a “necessity” for current and future Chinese oil interests, as well as national development and modernization.<sup>32</sup>

The expansion of the security boundary for oil is aided by the Peoples Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) increasing capability to project force.<sup>33</sup> The PLAN has purchased Sovremenny destroyers, Kilo-class submarines, anti-submarine sonar and multiple-target torpedo control systems, as well as undersea cruise missile technology.<sup>34</sup> It has meanwhile constructed its own Luyang I and II destroyers, as well as Jiangkai I and II frigates. Additionally, the navy plans to expand its submarine fleet by adding seventeen new “stealthy diesel submarines” by 2010 and has added three modern nuclear (ballistic missile capable) submarines.<sup>35</sup> The PLAN is also considering building multiple aircraft carriers and associated ships by 2020. Ministry of National Defense spokesman Senior Colonel Huang Xueping explained that, “the aircraft carrier is a symbol of a country’s overall national strength, as well as the competitiveness of the country’s naval force.” Director of the Ministry of National Defense, Foreign Affairs Office, Major General Qian Lihua similarly stated, “having an aircraft carrier is the dream of any great military power.”<sup>36</sup> More than a symbol and a dream, an aircraft carrier would greatly increase China’s ability to project power away from its shores.

### POWER, ONE PEARL AT A TIME

While China’s dreams of a powerful blue-water navy are still in dry dock, some analysts claim that Beijing has already hatched a potent strategy for power projection in the Indian Ocean. The “pearls strategy,” a term which originated in a report by US defense contractor Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH), refers to the extension of PLAN power through ports leased and acquired from Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Pakistan.<sup>37</sup> According to the BAH report, “China is building strategic relationships along the sea lanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea in a way that suggests defensive and offensive positioning to protect China’s energy interests.”<sup>38</sup> In the BAH paradigm, a pearl entails the construction of new ports, or improvement of those that exist, to serve dual trade and military interests, including supply, refueling and listening stations. As port facilities are attained, **the PLAN could press its presence forward** from Africa and the Strait of Hormuz to Myanmar and the Strait of Malacca.<sup>39</sup>

It is true that China has had a hand in building or refurbishing several geo-strategically-located ports in the region. In Pakistan, ports at Gwadar and Karachi have undergone extensive improvements and dredging by Chinese companies, as well as the construction of a new highway connecting them. The Gwadar port, referred to by US analysts as the “Chinese Gibraltar,” represents \$1.2 billion in Chinese investment. China further modernized or constructed ports belonging to Bangladesh, Maldives,

Seychelles, Mauritania, Madagascar and Sri Lanka. This includes the \$1 billion Sri Lankan port at Hambantota, which is a strategic six nautical miles from major sea lanes between the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea. China has also capitalized on a 1992 agreement with Myanmar for the construction of ports at Small and Great Coco Islands in return for the modernization of Myanmar's navy.<sup>40</sup> In addition, Chinese firms constructed or modernized ports at Sittwe, Kyaukpu, Mergui and Haingyi Island. Some Western analysts claim that the Chinese military also operates reconnaissance and electronic intelligence stations on several islands belonging to Myanmar, though Indian and American intelligence officials have said evidence is lacking.<sup>41</sup>

In spite of the impressive number of projects, few appear to have notable military resources. Moreover, even if China does intend to use the pearls for military purposes, its access to them in a time of conflict is doubtful. While Beijing has tried to cement ties with host countries through infrastructure projects and arms sales, its alliances and influence in the region remain relatively weak. China's relationships with Pakistan and Myanmar are far from solidified and cannot be taken for granted.<sup>42</sup> Pakistan, which is increasingly reliant on American economic and military aid, attempts to balance relations between China and the United States, seeing both as vital partners.<sup>43</sup> Though Myanmar has been the recipient of much Chinese aid, it has also been careful not to become overly reliant on any one patron. The junta leadership has proved skillful at building relationships with Japan and India to offset reliance on China. For instance, Myanmar is working towards agreements which will allow the Indian navy to use its ports at Sittwe and Dawei.<sup>44</sup> If China does indeed harbor a "tripartite strategy" of diplomacy, forward naval bases and greater naval presence, it is far from realization and its near-term aspirations in the Indian Ocean will be limited.<sup>45</sup> Moreover, it is not clear why China would bet its oil security on outposts in the Indian Ocean when US interdiction would probably occur in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz and Arabian Sea, long before the shipments reach the strategic sea lanes.<sup>46</sup> As China is surely aware of these realities, its intentions to rely on these ports for military strength are far from proven.

### TANGLED PERCEPTIONS

Whether or not China is actively utilizing the pearls, or plans to in the future, India *perceives* Chinese actions as power maximization, which could lead to a "reordering of the balance of power" in the Indian Ocean.<sup>47</sup> India fears that China's political influence, military modernization and forward basing strategy will be used to contain India as China ascends as the pre-eminent Asian power.<sup>48</sup> They fear that Chinese intentions are combative, power seeking and against peaceful co-existence.<sup>49</sup> Indian leaders further speculate that China is trying to rapidly achieve hegemony in the Indian Ocean while it enjoys a position of strength. They comprehend China's strategies as opportunistic, arising from weak and ineffective Indian attempts at deterrence and balancing.<sup>50</sup> Similarly, John Mearsheimer states, "A great power that

has a marked power advantage over its rivals is likely to behave more aggressively because it has the capability, as well as, the incentive to do so.”<sup>51</sup> Offensive realism concurs in positing that a nation may formulate policies that increase its relative power compared to its nearest competitor in order to acquire more power.<sup>52</sup>

Like China, India also faces a change from relative dependence to one of absolute dependence on oil imports and seeks secure sea lanes and geographic access to oil. India relies upon the same sea lanes for shipments of oil originating in Egypt, Sudan, Nigeria, Iraq, Iran and Myanmar. Similar to China, India fears that its access to oil shipments could be abrogated in a time of conflict.<sup>53</sup> In 2005, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated, “China is ahead of us in planning for its energy security, India can no longer be so complacent.”<sup>54</sup>

In line with the realist school of thought, Indian leaders appear to advocate political and military power corresponding to its oil security and thus, have pursued ambitious economic, diplomatic and military strategies.<sup>55</sup> The Indian Navy plans for a fleet of 130 vessels comprising “three aircraft carrier battle groups, by 2020” and has created the Far Eastern Naval Command (FENC), headquartered at Port Blair, Andaman Islands, which sits 190 nautical miles from China’s facilities at Great Coco Island.<sup>56</sup> India has also constructed dual-use ports at Dawei, Myanmar and Chabahar, Iran and is presently constructing the Sethu Samudram Shipping Canal. Indian national security is seemingly no longer concerned with only the sub-continent, but is part of a growing and developing security boundary comprising nearby states, seas and the Indian Ocean.<sup>57</sup>

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*Whether or not China utilizes the Pearls, India perceives Chinese actions as power maximization.*

In the mid-1990s, India began pursuing an ambitious strategy of using the United States as a possible counterweight against Chinese aspirations.<sup>58</sup> In 1995, India and the United States signed the *Agreed Minute on Defense Relations*, which authorized joint combating of terrorism, as well as other regional crises. The Indian and US militaries began conducting joint operations such as “COPE India” in 2005, to strengthen combat skill and hasten a stronger and quicker response to probable crises in the region. Over 25 joint training exercises were held between 2002 and 2005, leading up to the *New Framework for the US-India Defense Relationship* (NFDR).<sup>59</sup> The NFDR charts a long-range course for India-US defense relations and facilitates increased military ties, joint weapons production, and cooperation in missile defense. NFDR also combines efforts to defeat terrorism and curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, along with enhancing the security of trade within the region’s land, air and sea lanes.<sup>60</sup>

*Sampling of India-US Joint Military Operations 2002-2009<sup>61</sup>*

| Year | Operation          | Location                                | Purpose  |
|------|--------------------|---|--|
| 2002 | Balance Iroquois   | Agra, India                             | Special Forces airborne exercises  |
| 2002 | Geronimo Thrust    | Alaska                                  | Special Forces airborne exercises  |
| 2002 | Cope India         | Agra, India                             | Air transport exercise   |
| 2003 | Malabar            | Kochi, India                            | Naval exercise (including Air Force and anti-submarine exercises)                  |
| 2003 | n/a                | New Delhi, India                        | Peacekeeping command post exercise   |
| 2004 | Vajra Prahar       | Mizoram, India                          | Special Forces counter insurgency exercises  |
| 2004 | Yudha Abhyas       | Mizoram, India                          | Special Forces counter insurgency and jungle warfare exercises                     |
| 2004 | Cope Thunder       | Alaska                                  | Air Force exercises  |
| 2005 | Malabar 04         | Indian Southwest coast-<br>Indian Ocean | Naval training exercises   |
| 2005 | Cope India 05      | Kalaikunda, Air Base<br>India           | Air Force combat training exercises  |
| 2007 | Malabar 07         | Bay of Bengal, India                    | Air Force combat training exercises<br>(multilateral- Japan, Australia, Singapore) |
| 2008 | Red Flag War Games | Nellis Air Base, Nevada                 | Air Force combat training exercises  |
| 2009 | n/a                | Hickam Air Base,<br>Hawaii              | Air Force training exercises   |

However, India's strategies could lead to a security dilemma plagued by uncertainty and misassumption over real or imagined intentions. China may comprehend Indian moves as aggressive and could "mistakenly believe that aggression is the only way to make their state secure," which justifies further investment in military solutions.<sup>62</sup> Although Indian leaders such as Manmohan Singh have continuously emphasized India's military weakness, China feels militarily disadvantaged in the Indian Ocean due to the India-US alliance, as well as Indian naval strength.<sup>63</sup> This predicament has led China to perceive Indian strategies as emanating from offensive realism and has further nudged Beijing to expand its security boundary. The confused perceptions of each other's intentions could set in motion a chain of reactions escalating toward a zero-sum contest.<sup>64</sup>

Relations between China and India will likely continue to emanate from defensive realism, but relations can be less difficult through increasing political and military transparency. Both nations have started this process by engaging in joint naval exercises in 2003, 2005 and 2007, signing a Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation in 2006, engaging in ministerial visits, calling at each others' ports and engaging in counterterrorism exercises.<sup>65</sup> There has also been discussion, although nothing more, on co-developing energy projects in the region—in Sudan, for example—and the shared use of ports.<sup>66</sup> Perhaps these developments can be a step in

the direction of recognizing the Indian Ocean and its sea lanes as part of the international commons, utilized by many nations rather than as part of a strategic competition. However, this approach will also require the participation of third parties, who have been drawn into tangled alliances with the two countries. Though a more rational and reasoned approach between China and India appears to be triumphing at the moment, the two nations can continue to improve relations by giving heed to the security dilemma, while simultaneously showing a sincere readiness to engage in transparent discourse and diplomacy. Such transparency may lead to a de-emphasis of the security boundary's more confrontational military and diplomatic strategies and toward greater conciliation and cooperation. 🌐

NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Willy Lam, "Beijing's Reaction to East Asia's Changing Alliances," *China Brief* 4, no. 15 (August 10, 2004), p. 2.
- <sup>2</sup> Cesar Chelala, "China Plays Maritime Chess," *The Japan Times*, Jan. 22, 2009, <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/rss/eo20090122cc.html> (accessed June 15, 2009); *Peoples Liberation Navy – Offshore Defense*, <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/plan-doctrine-offshore.htm>> (accessed Sept. 27, 2009); Zhang Wenmu, "Sea Power and China's Strategic Choices," *China Security* (Summer 2006), p. 21.
- <sup>3</sup> Chelala, op. cit; Peoples, op. cit; Wenmu, p. 21.
- <sup>4</sup> Stephen M. Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," *International Relations*, No. 112 (1998), p. 30.
- <sup>5</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), p. 19.
- <sup>6</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," in R. Rotberg and T. Rabb, ed., *The Order and Prevention of Major Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 43.
- <sup>7</sup> Tom Barry, "The US Power Complex: What's New," *Foreign Policy in Focus*, November 2002, p. 2.
- <sup>8</sup> Eric N. Heller, "Power Projections of the People's Republic of China: A Investigative Analysis of Defensive and Offensive Realism in Chinese Foreign Policy. Program for Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS) Occasional Paper, Urban-Champaign: University of Illinois, ACDIS Occasional Paper, November 2003, pp. 21-22.
- <sup>9</sup> Heller, p. 21.
- <sup>10</sup> Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* Vol. 46, No. 116 (Spring 1992), pp. 406-407.
- <sup>11</sup> "Conversations in International Relations: Interview with John J. Mearsheimer," *International Relations*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (2006), p. 234.
- <sup>12</sup> Heller, pp. 20-21.
- <sup>13</sup> Stephen G. Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), p. 462.
- <sup>14</sup> Benjamin H. Friedman, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "You Never Know(ism)," *Breakthroughs*, Vol. 12 No. 1 (Spring 2006), p. 3.
- <sup>15</sup> Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking Under Anarchy," *International Security*, Vol. 25 No. 64 (2000-2001), pp. 128-129.
- <sup>16</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 201.
- <sup>17</sup> Sergei Trough, *China's Changing Oil Strategy and its Foreign Policy Implication* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999), p. 2; and Kenneth Lieberthal and Michael Heberg, "China's Search for Energy Security: Implications for US Policy," *NBR Analysis: The National Bureau of Asian Research*, No. 17 (2006), p. 7.
- <sup>18</sup> Hanson, op. cit; US-China Hearing, p. 32.
- <sup>19</sup> Philip A. Speed and Sergei Vinogradov, "China's Involvement in Central Asian Petroleum: Convergent or Divergent Interests?" *Asian Survey*, Vol. 40 No. 2 (March-April 2000), pp. 385, 387.
- <sup>20</sup> *China: An Energy Sector Overview*, United States Energy Information Administration, October 1997, <http://www.eia.doe.gov> (accessed April 14, 2006); *China: Energy Profile*, United States Energy Information Administration, Aug. 20, 2008, <[http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country\\_energy\\_data.cfm?fips=CH](http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=CH)> (accessed Aug. 25, 2008); *China: Energy Situation*, United States Energy

Information Administration, 2006, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/archives/china/part2.html> (accessed April 14, 2006); Joseph Dancy, "Energy Sector: Oil Demand from China, India Continues to Rocket Upward," *Financial Sense University*, May 16, 2008, <http://www.financialsense.com/fsu/editorials/dancy/2008/0516b.html> (accessed July 10, 2009); Erica S. Downs, *China's Role in the World: Is China a Responsible Stakeholder?* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, August 4, 2006), pp. 4-5; Erica S. Downs, "The Fact and Fiction of Sino-African Relations," *China Security*, Vol. 3 No. 3 (Summer 2007), pp. 4-5; Thomas E. Drennen and Jon D. Erickson, "Who Will Fuel China?" *Science*, Vol. 279 No. 5356 (March 1998), p. 1483; Peter C. Evans and Erica S. Downs, *Untangling China's Quest for Oil through State-backed Financial Deals* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2006), p. 2; Mathew Forney, "China's Quest for Oil," *Time*, Oct. 18, 2004, p. 13; *International Energy Outlook: 1999* (Washington D.C.: United States Energy Information Administration, IEA99: Government Printing Office, 1999), p. 141; *International Energy Outlook: 2007* (Washington D.C.: United States Energy Information Administration, IEA99, Government Printing Office, 2007), pp. 38, 88, 105, 121, 137, 153; Michael T. Klare, *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, LLC., 2002), pp. 110, 114-115; David J. Lynch, "Debate Brews: Has Oil Production Peaked?" *USA Today*, Oct. 17, 2005, 1B; *NationMaster: World Statistics, Country Comparisons*, 2009, <http://www.nationmaster.com/country/ch-china/ene-energy> (accessed June 26, 2009); Nawaf A. Obaid, Amy Jaffe, Edward L. Morse, Chad Gracia and Kirk Bromely, *The Sino-Saud Energy Rapprochement: Implications for US National Security* (Washington D.C.: The Gracia Group, United States Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Jan. 8, 2002, pp. 5-6; John Wong and Wong C. Kong, *China's New Oil Development Strategy Taking Shape*, (Singapore: East Asia Institute Contemporary China Series No. 7: Singapore University Press, 1998), pp. 17, 19.

<sup>21</sup> Trough, 2.

<sup>22</sup> Trough, 2.

<sup>23</sup> *Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 2009* (United States Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense: Washington D.C.), p. 40; Obaid, Jaffe, Morse, Gracia and Bromely, pp. 13, 19; US-China 2005, pp. 168-170; Yamaguchi, Fridley and Xiaoming, p. 7.

<sup>24</sup> Michael Meidan, "China's Africa Policy: Business Now, Politics Later," *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 30 No. 4 (2006), p. 87.

<sup>25</sup> *Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 2009* (United States Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense: Washington D.C.), p. 40; Obaid, Jaffe, Morse, Gracia and Bromely, pp. 13, 19; US-China 2005, pp. 168-170; Yamaguchi, Fridley and Xiaoming, p. 7.

<sup>26</sup> Lam, p. 3; Wenmu, Sea 17-31: 19.

<sup>27</sup> Zweig and Jiambai, p. 33.

<sup>28</sup> Shi Hongtao, "Energy Security Runs Up Against the Malacca Dilemma," *Zhongguo qingnian bao*, June 15, 2004, <http://www.business.sohu.com/2004/06/15/49/article220534904.shtml> (accessed Sept. 29, 2009); Zhang Yuncheng, "The Malacca Strait and World Oil Security," *Huanqiu Shibao*, Dec. 5, 2003, (attained from Reston, Virginia: United States Federal Broadcast Information Service, Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Science and Technology)

<sup>29</sup> Zhang Wenmu, "China's Energy Security and Policy Choices," *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi*, May 14, 2003, pp. 12-13; *Annual Report-Military Power 2009*, p. 12.

<sup>30</sup> Barron, 79.

<sup>31</sup> *Annual Report-Military Power 2009*, p. 17.

<sup>32</sup> Xie Zhijun, "Asian Seas in the 21st Century: With So Many Rival Navies, How Will China Manage?" *Junshi Wenzhai*, Feb. 1, 2001, p. 21.

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<sup>34</sup> Annual Report-Military Power 2009, p. 22; Robert D. Kaplan, "How We Would Fight China," *The Atlantic*, June 2005, p. 55; Robyn Lim. *The Geopolitics of East Asia: The Search for Equilibrium*. (New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 152.

<sup>35</sup> Annual Report-Military Power 2009, pp. 22, 49; Chelala, op. cit; David Lague, "China's Growing Undersea Fleet Presents Challenge to its Neighbors," *Wall Street Journal*, Nov. 29, 2004, A12; Kaplan, p. 55.

<sup>36</sup> Annual Report-Military Power 2009, p. 18.

<sup>37</sup> Christopher J. Pehrson, *String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenges of China's Rising Power Across the Asian Littoral* (Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College, Carlisle, PA, July 2006), p. 3.

<sup>38</sup> Zweig and Jiambai, p. 33.

<sup>39</sup> "US is Threatened by 'Aggressive Chinese Sea' Power," *Al Jazeera*, Sept. 14, 2005, <[www.aljazeera.com/cgi-bin/conspiracy\\_theory/fullstory.asp?id=259](http://www.aljazeera.com/cgi-bin/conspiracy_theory/fullstory.asp?id=259)> (accessed July 7, 2009)

<sup>40</sup> Pehrson, pp. 3-7; US-China 2005, p. 120.

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