China's nuclear strategy has been the subject of intense scrutiny in the United States since China tested and developed its first nuclear device in 1964. For most of that time, China has maintained the policies of No-First-Use and minimum deterrence to define its nuclear program. Yet, with a changing strategic dynamic in a post-Cold War era, a fresh debate over China's nuclear strategy and the U.S. policies affecting it is necessary and long overdue. In a meeting with journalists in July, 2005, Maj.-Gen. Zhu Chenghu caused a political firestorm in Washington by talking openly and bluntly of a nuclear exigency should conflict arise with the United States over the Taiwan Straits. China Security has invited three authoritative experts in China as well as one in the United States to critique Zhu's remarks, but more broadly, to also address the implications for the future of China's nuclear policies and U.S.-China nuclear relations. While Zhu's controversial comments inevitably put the focus on China's nuclear strategy and ambitions, the authors also reflect on how U.S. policies and nuclear strategy are driving forces behind the Chinese concerns that Zhu's words likely represent.

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