China Security

The Limits of Partnership
China, NATO and the Afghan War
Richard Weitz

Multiple paradoxes pervade China’s policies toward Afghanistan. The leaders of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) perceive unprecedented commercial opportunities in Afghanistan, but lack the means to pursue them without the support of other national governments that might prefer to limit China’s influence there. While PRC policymakers oppose a long-term Western military presence in China’s backyard, they fear that an abrupt NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan would endanger important Chinese commercial and security interests. In addition, Beijing fears that the growing strength of Islamist extremists in Afghanistan is increasing the terrorist threat to China itself as well as its close ally Pakistan. But PRC leaders worry that supporting the anti-Taliban coalition militarily would make China a more likely target for terrorism and alienate Beijing from Afghanistan’s future government. Given these contradictions, the Obama administration will find it extremely difficult to establish a major strategic partnership with Beijing in Afghanistan.

Striking Hard at Terrorism

From 1949 through the mid-1970s, the PRC developed modestly good relations with the government of Afghanistan. These ties withered after a pro-Soviet group gained power in Kabul and sided with Moscow against Beijing. Relations collapsed when the Soviet Union sent tens of thousands of combat troops in late 1979 to help the beleaguered Afghan government suppress a popular uprising against its un-Islamic Marxist-Leninist policies. The Soviet intervention converted Afghanistan into yet another Cold War battlefield. The Chinese government played an active if low-key role in assisting the anti-Soviet insurgency by providing weapons and training in collaboration with the United States and Pakistan, where most of the guerrillas were based. The PRC refused to recognize the government that Moscow established in Kabul and did not normalize relations with Afghanistan until 1992, after the insurgents captured the capital and established a new “Islamic State of Afghanistan.” When the guerrilla factions resumed fighting among themselves for power, the PRC withdrew its diplomatic staff from Kabul in February 1993 and did not reopen its embassy until February 2002.[1]
The emergence of the Taliban during the mid-1990s as the dominant political-military faction in Afghanistan alarmed Chinese officials. Elements of the Taliban had ties with Islamic extremist groups advocating independence for China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, an area constituting one-sixth of China that borders Pakistan and several Central Asian countries, including Afghanistan. Of the region’s twenty million inhabitants, approximately half are non-Han Chinese Muslims with ethnic and religious links to neighboring Turkic populations in Central Asia—though this percentage has been steadily falling due to Beijing’s policy of encouraging Han migration into Xinjiang to strengthen its integration with the rest of China.[2] Xinjiang experienced assassinations, bombings and other endemic violence during the early 1990s from some Uyghur nationalists who sought to establish an “East Turkestan Islamic Republic” by attacking Chinese government targets and Chinese civilians.[3] The PRC authorities accused the Taliban of providing training to “at least hundreds of East Turkestan terrorists” in Afghanistan.[4] The Beijing government reacted with a “strike hard” campaign against suspected Uyghur terrorists. Through the new institution of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, created in 2001, and various bilateral mechanisms, the PRC also provided assistance to Central Asian governments fighting Taliban-linked terrorists that could also threaten China. These countermeasures have failed to end ethnic unrest in Xinjiang and tensions between Hans and Uyghurs have continued to escalate.

Starting in early 2008, Chinese officials accused Uyghur groups, supposedly linked with al-Qaeda and the Dalai Lama, of various plots to disrupt the 2008 Summer Olympics.[5] On April 10, the Chinese authorities announced they had exposed a plot by Muslim terrorists to kidnap foreigners and carry out suicide attacks in Beijing during the Olympics. In a news conference, a PRC Ministry of Public Security official stated that the authorities had detained 45 suspects involved in two terrorist groups planning to use firearms, explosives and other weapons to disrupt the Games. In addition to the aforementioned alleged Olympic plots, PRC officials claimed that on March 7, Islamist terrorists had attempted to crash an airliner flying from Urumqi to Beijing. Wang Lequan, Xinjiang’s Communist Party chief, stated that the act was “instigated and conducted by East Turkestan separatists from abroad.” He warned that “terrorists, saboteurs and secessionists are to be battered resolutely, no matter what ethnic group they are from.”[6] The number of publicly announced arrests in Xinjiang for “endangering state security” also soared in 2008.[7]

The claims that Uyghur terrorists were seeking to disrupt the Olympics, like earlier allegations that supporters of the Dalai Lama were planning to organize suicide attacks during the Games, remain unproven. Some Uyghurs participated in the protest against the Chinese-run torch relay, but PRC security officials have yet to produce convincing evidence of a Uyghur conspiracy to attack the Summer Olympics or to confirm other announced plots. Nonetheless, the July 2009 ethnic riots in Xinjiang—in which some 200 people died and more than 1,600 were injured when Uyghurs and Hans engaged in vicious street battles—have undoubtedly heightened PRC policymakers’ concerns about the resurgence of Taliban strength in Afghanistan. Islamist groups cited the incident to depict Beijing as yet another oppressor of Muslims.[8] If the Taliban can regain power in Afghanistan or carve out safe areas for training regional terrorist groups, some of these terrorists could attack Chinese targets.

The PRC’s counterterrorist strategy in Xinjiang relates to Beijing’s foreign energy and security policies. A prime concern for the Chinese is gaining access to Central Asian energy resources. At present, policymakers in Beijing are uneasy about relying so heavily on vulnerable Persian Gulf energy sources, which traverse sea lanes that are susceptible to interception by foreign navies. In addition, the Chinese government recognizes that terrorism, military conflicts and other sources of instability in the Middle East could abruptly disrupt Gulf energy exports. Since Chinese efforts to import much additional oil and gas from Russia have proved problematic, Beijing is pushing for the development of land-based oil and gas pipelines that would direct Central Asian energy resources eastward to China. New inland routes would provide more secure energy supplies to China than existing seaborne links. The PRC is beginning to develop direct pipelines with its Central Asian neighbors, especially Kazakhstan. Avoiding political instability in these countries is thus a key concern for Chinese policymakers.

Besides securing access to the region’s energy resources, PRC officials also seek to enhance commerce between China’s relatively impoverished northwestern regions and their Central Asian neighbors. This consideration applies particularly to restless Xinjiang, since over half the province’s income is derived from trade with Central Asian countries.[9] Trade across the PRC’s other borders with Central Asia also has been increasing, albeit starting from very low levels. The Chinese government has granted hundreds of millions of dollars in credits to Central Asian countries for the purchase of Chinese goods. Increased commerce could help promote the economic development of Xinjiang, Tibet and other regions that have lagged behind the PRC’s vibrant eastern cities.

The Opium Crescent

Curbing the influx of narcotics from Afghanistan—now the world’s largest national opium producer—has become another priority for Beijing. In the past, PRC authorities were most concerned with the opium produced and imported from the Golden Triangle—the mountainous opium-growing area falling within Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and China’s Yunnan Province—but this problem has decreased significantly in the past decade.[10] At the same time, the volume of narcotics entering the PRC from the Golden Crescent—a heroin-producing zone that comprises portions of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan—has surged.[11] In addition, the Badakhshan region, which is situated in both Afghanistan and Tajikistan, has seen a major increase in heroin production facilities.[12] In 2004, the Chinese government estimated that as much as 20 percent of the heroin available in the PRC originated from Afghanistan; that figure is likely higher today.[13]

The increasing volume of narcotics entering the PRC has coincided with growing Chinese demand for illicit drugs: in 2008, narcotics use in China climbed by 9.2 percent.[14] Xinjiang and other regions have reported a sharp rise in narcotics consumption and drug-related cases of HIV/AIDS due to the influx of Afghan drugs.[15] While reliable statistics are difficult to come by, the South China Morning Post has suggested that Xinjiang has overtaken Yunnan and the Golden Triangle as the main entry point for narcotics into China.[16] According to another Chinese media source, Xinjiang’s local police prosecuted 1,563 drug-related cases, arrested almost 2,000 suspects, and seized 144 kilograms of imported heroin transported from Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2008.[17]

In response to local officials’ pleas for help, President Hu Jintao reportedly circulated an internal memo calling on security forces in Xinjiang to combat narcotics trafficking more aggressively.[18] PRC officials are well aware of the link between illegal drug sales and terrorist financing. Reports of Afghan Taliban commanders using revenues from the opium trade to purchase weapons, fund training and buy support are widespread.[19] Other Islamist terrorist movements active in Central Asia also finance activities through narcotics trafficking.[20] The resulting increase in the strength of the Islamist terrorist groups risks empowering Uyghur militants and threatens China’s newly acquired economic interests in Afghanistan.

Beijing’s Economic Surge

From 1994 to 2002, when Afghanistan was swept up in its post-Soviet civil war, Chinese-Afghan trade ranged between US$17-39 million annually. Despite the end of the Taliban regime following the American invasion in late 2001, and the establishment of new Afghan government institutions under President Hamid Karzai, Chinese-Afghan economic ties remained modest until only recently. The Chinese government provided Afghanistan with some financial assistance in support of various reconstruction projects, such as $10 million for an irrigation complex at Parwan and a hospital in Kabul.[21] In May 2003, the two governments signed an Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement, which provided $15 million to the Afghan government in Chinese grants.[22] Chinese and Afghan businesses also engaged in some commerce. For example, China’s ZTE and Huawei Telecommunications upgraded analog telephone lines used by 200,000 Afghan subscribers to digital ones.[23] Even so, the PRC Ministry of Commerce reports that China’s trade with Afghanistan was still below $50 million annually in 2007 and 2008.[24] Political ties also remained modest. It was only in 2006 that Karzai visited Beijing to meet with the Chinese President Hu Jintao. On that occasion, the two presidents signed a bilateral treaty of friendship and cooperation.[25]

Yet after the Afghan government opened its energy, mineral and raw material sectors to foreign investment in 2008, China rapidly became one of Afghanistan’s largest foreign investors with state-owned China Metallurgical Group (MCC)’s surprise purchase of a controlling stake in what could be the world’s largest copper field at Aynak. According to the Afghanistan and British Geological Surveys, the copper deposit there contains 240 million tons of material with a high grade of 2.3 percent copper in the central portion of the deposit.[26] Whatever its ultimate recoverable holdings, the project is the largest foreign direct investment and private business venture deal in Afghanistan’s history. The mine is scheduled to begin operations in six years and employ about 10,000 people as well as create other jobs indirectly (such as workers providing services to the miners). A contract provision mandates that the project employ only Afghans after 7 years except for some Chinese administrators. Moreover, Aynak operations are expected to provide $400 million in royalties, more than half of Afghanistan’s current state budget.[27] The project will also bring further Chinese investment to Afghanistan’s infrastructure: China will need to build a copper smelter and a power plant at the site, a coal mine and groundwater system to support these operations, and a transportation network to bring equipment and other supplies to the mining site as well as to export the extracted products to China. The Chinese bid for the mines included the cost of building a 400-megawatt, coal-fired power plant and Afghanistan’s first railroad, which will convey freight from western China through Tajikistan to the site and from northern Afghanistan to the country’s southeastern border with Pakistan.[28]

Neither MCC nor the Chinese government will reimburse the US forces who guard the site as well as the projected routes for the road and railway as part of their Afghanistan defense mission.[29] After the deal was signed, Taliban insurgents increased their operations in the area, prompting more than 2,000 troops from the US Army 10th Mountain Division to enter the region in response.[30] American and NATO forces protect other foreign investments and critical infrastructure from insurgent attacks, but China’s prominent economic presence, unaccompanied by PRC soldiers deployed to Afghanistan to assist in the country’s defense, is likely to place this uneven security relationship under further strain. Suspicions also exist that not all the hoped-for benefits will materialize, as well as concerns about what will become of the investment and locality after the lease expires.

Nonetheless, Chinese and other foreign investors presumably desire to acquire additional natural resources in Afghanistan if the security situation permits.[31] In this sense, the success of the Chinese venture in Aynak could serve as a catalyst for additional foreign investment, particularly in the former state-owned companies that the Afghan government is now privatizing. Afghanistan is thought to have unexplored or underdeveloped reserves of oil, natural gas, iron, gold, copper and other raw materials that China imports in abundance.[32] Exploiting these resources and transporting them to China will require building transportation and other networks. According to the Chinese government, in 2008 Chinese firms were engaged in 33 infrastructure projects (such as road construction) in Afghanistan, valued at almost half a billion dollars, in addition to the Aynak copper investment.[33] By acquiring these goods from Afghanistan, the PRC could further diversify its source of imports away from more distant world regions, whose products are transported to China along lengthy ocean shipping routes vulnerable to pirates, foreign navies and other interruptions. Importing materials from Afghanistan also allows Beijing to pursue a more geographically balanced process of internal economic development. China’s western provinces need readily available natural resources in order to develop. Furthermore, trade with Afghanistan would accelerate the economic growth of the sensitive region of Xinjiang, which borders Afghanistan as well as Pakistan and the Central Asian republics—countries that have also seen considerable Chinese direct investment in recent years.[34]

No Crusades

In addition to assisting with economic reconstruction, PRC officials have offered general support for the Afghan government’s efforts to fight the Taliban and drug trafficking. In a speech to the Paris International Conference in Support of Afghanistan in June 2008, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi stated that the PRC “would continue to enhance cooperation with Afghanistan on law enforcement and intelligence sharing and take an active part in the international efforts to set up an anti-drug security belt” and that “capacity building and personnel training have always been the focus in China’s assistance to Afghanistan.”[35] Similarly, State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan has affirmed that, since peace and stability in Afghanistan are in the interest of China as well as of the rest of the world, the PRC is prepared “to strengthen cooperation with Afghanistan on non-traditional security issues and support Afghanistan to play an active role in regional affairs.”[36] Yet China’s security ties with Afghanistan remain much less developed than with many other Central and South Asian governments. Rather, its role in Afghanistan resembles Beijing’s policies in Iraq, which have focused on investing in the Iraqi energy sector while shunning any major security role.

Chinese policymakers seem ambiguous about the US and NATO role in both Afghanistan and Iraq. They certainly do not want Islamist extremists to triumph there, since they could then use these territories, especially Afghanistan, to spread extremism to the PRC. Chinese officials also have traditionally avoided challenging the United States on core security issues—and the Obama administration has clearly identified the Afghan theater as one of them. Having the Americans take the lead in fighting Islamist insurgents in Afghanistan and elsewhere also relieves China of having to fight them directly. PRC policymakers prefer that the United States and its allies bear the burden of countering radical Islamist movements outside of China since they have already become alarmed at how Islamist extremists are depicting their policies within China, especially Xinjiang, as anti-Muslim. A week after the July 2009 Uyghur-Han riots, a PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson explained that:

We hope that the Islamic countries and our Muslim brothers could see the truth of July 5 incident in Urumqi, and I believe if they do so, they will surely understand and support China's ethnic and religious policy and the measures adopted to handle the incident. China and the Islamic countries have long been respecting and supporting each other and the Chinese Government and people always firmly support the just cause of the Islamic countries to pursue national independence and safeguard state sovereignty.[37]

In this context, China policymakers would not want to take a lead role in supporting an Afghan military operation that is sometimes characterized as an ethnic or religious conflict, with Islamist extremists denouncing the endeavor as an international anti-Muslim crusade. When discussing proposals that the PRC contribute more to coalition efforts to attack Taliban and al-Qaeda elements in Afghanistan, the director of the Central Asia Research Institute at the Xinjiang Social Science Academy, Pang Zhiping, wondered aloud, “Why would you make yourself the target of global terrorist organizations?”[38] Equally revealing was how the PRC media reacted on January 16, 2010, when two Chinese engineers working on a road-building project in northeast Afghanistan were kidnapped by alleged Taliban members, who demanded a ransom to release them.[39] The press reported that “Chinese analysts said they are perplexed, as they believe that it is not Taliban strategy to challenge China.”[40] Beijing seeks good relations with the governments of Muslim-majority countries in order to secure access to their natural resources and their diplomatic support in general. At worst, PRC policymakers prefer to remain “enemy number two” on the terrorists’ list of perceived anti-Islamist states.[41] In many cases, China ranks even further down, since Islamist groups also typically confront more immediate local adversaries, such as the national governments of the countries in which they operate. Chinese officials also appreciate that the stalemated wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have served the useful purpose of diverting Washington’s attention from the Asia-Pacific region, presenting fewer obstacles to the realization of Beijing’s goals there.[42]

Yet while Chinese leaders do not challenge the legitimacy of NATO military operations in Afghanistan, and want the alliance to continue to fight Eurasian narco-terrorism and promote Afghanistan’s economic and political reconstruction, they do not support a long-term Western military presence in the country or the Central Asian region.[43] In the past, the lack of formal ties between China and NATO made it difficult for the two parties to discuss regional security cooperation. Relations have remained especially strained after US warplanes bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo air campaign in May 1999.[44] Unlike the former Soviet republics, China does not participate separately in the alliance’s Partnership for Peace program, nor does it have a “dialogue partnership” with NATO as Japan does. Although Beijing does discuss proliferation and other security issues with NATO intermittently, this dialogue occurs with the Chinese Foreign Ministry rather than the People’s Liberation Army and the other more influential elements of the Chinese defense establishment.[45] A September 2006 editorial in the semi-official People’s Daily decried what it described as US plans to transform the alliance into a “Global NATO” by endowing it with a large rapid response force capable of worldwide operations. In an indirect expression of Chinese government concerns, the paper said that the alliance’s “interference in the affairs of major ‘hot spot’ regions”, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, had already “drawn extensive concern of people worldwide.”[46] Although NATO-China relations have improved since then, enough distrust persists to make most Chinese prefer that NATO keep out of neighboring areas. Given these conflicting pressures, China has publicly supported the Afghan government but sought to distance itself from the US-led counterinsurgency campaigns both there and in Iraq, and refrained from endorsing any lengthy Western military presence in the region.

China’s limited support for the NATO-US-Afghan counterinsurgency campaign has provoked some irritation among Western observers about China’s “free riding” on the back of dead European, American and Afghan soldiers. As long as NATO governments are experiencing difficulties defending the Afghan government against the Taliban, they will pressure Beijing for greater military as well as economic assistance. Following the first US-China Defense Policy Coordination Talks under the Obama administration in February 2009, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia David Sedney remarked that, “This is an area where we're looking to see more contributions from the international community—and of course ... this means China—to assist in the many, many needs that are in Afghanistan.”[47]

This is not to say that some Chinese-American collaboration regarding Afghanistan has not occurred. In April 2009, the US Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, held two days of talks with senior Chinese officials in Beijing, including Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi. Holbrooke declared that, “We came here to share views on the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan because we share a common danger, a common challenge and a common goal.”[48] Although less effusive, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu observed, “The two sides said they would make efforts to enhance dialogue and cooperation and promote peace, stability and development in South Asia.”[49] Chinese government representatives have held consultations with NATO forces regarding the security of the Aynak copper venture.[50] In the November 2009 US-China Joint Statement issued during President Barack Obama's visit to China, the two governments said that they “support the efforts of Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight terrorism, maintain domestic stability and achieve sustainable economic and social development, and support the improvement and growth of relations between India and Pakistan. The two sides are ready to strengthen communication, dialogue and cooperation on issues related to South Asia and work together to promote peace, stability and development in that region.”[51]

Yet the Chinese government has continued to reject suggestions that it contribute combat forces to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force seeking to pacify Afghanistan. After British Prime Minister Gordon Brown remarked at a November 2008 meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York that Chinese troops might deploy to Afghanistan in the future, PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Qin Gang rapidly dismissed the proposal, observing that, with the exception of non-combat soldiers on traditional UN peacekeeping missions, “China never sends troops abroad.”[52] PRC representatives have since restated this position, and also dismissed inquiries about whether NATO could send supplies, even non-lethal ones such as food and clothing, through Chinese territory to Afghanistan to support the coalition militaries there. In March 2009, NATO’s difficulties in supplying its troop contingents in Afghanistan led a US official to remark that the alliance was considering seeking Beijing’s help in providing an alternative supply link through western China into Afghanistan. The PRC Ambassador to Germany, Ma Canrong, responded by insisting that Beijing would need more extensive consultations with NATO before offering concrete support.[53]

NATO inquiries have focused on transporting goods through the narrow sliver of territory connecting Afghanistan to China, the remote and mountainous 400 kilometer-long Wakhan Corridor. Created in 1895-96 by Imperial Russia and Great Britain as a buffer between their two empires,[54] the corridor was once an important conduit for trade. Since the early 20th century, however, China has closed the border to most commercial traffic. Last year, the PRC did improve the transportation and security infrastructure of the corridor. Local media relate that Chinese Ministry of Defense has been constructing a road along the border to increase the mobility of the frontier forces as well as their supplies. It has also been upgrading the food and communications services available to the border forces.[55] But these efforts seem to be driven more by the desire to strengthen China’s commercial role through linking Afghanistan and the PRC while fortifying the country’s defense capabilities should the corridor fall under Taliban control.

The Chinese media regularly publish articles warning against allowing NATO governments to deliver supplies through the corridor or providing other military assistance to coalition military forces. For example, one article that appeared in mid-January 2010 described US war leaders as militarily desperate to secure Beijing’s assistance to stave off defeat: “they have tried to drag China into its mess in Afghanistan and Pakistan by asking China to allow them to use the Wakhan corridor for its military operations. I hope that [the] Chinese government can detect American intentions in this strategy, and that it is wise enough to deny America’s request.”[56] The author added that supporting the coalition’s failing military intervention would prove most costly to China given its geography: “The US forces and its allies will have to leave Afghanistan and Pakistan sooner or later, but the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan will always be there. China should not alienate them hotheadedly.”[57] Chinese Internet users warn of dark US and Indian plots to drag China into an unwinnable war or establish US military bases on Chinese territory near Wakhan in violation of the PRC’s national sovereignty.[58] The People’s Daily purportedly conducted an online survey of the responses given to the question “Should China send troops to Afghanistan?” Although the paper claimed that the voting was divided, it asserted that a majority opposed the idea, citing a variety of reasons. These included damaging “China’s peace-loving national image,” creating “some unnecessary trouble” by exposing the PRC to global terrorist threats, alarming China’s neighbors and giving evidence to those who clamor about the “China threat.”[59]

Pakistani and SCO Connections

China’s close ties to Pakistan also help define the PRC’s potential role in Afghanistan, though in conflicting ways. Beijing has traditionally considered Pakistan a counterweight to India in South Asia and a significant economic partner, both directly and as a transit partner. On the one hand, the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan adversely affects Pakistan’s stability by contributing to the growth of Islamist militancy within the country, especially in the border regions where Afghan Taliban and other Islamist militants have established extensive logistics support bases. If Pakistani extremists gain control of one of the country’s nuclear weapons or materials that they could combine with conventional explosives to make a “dirty bomb,” one of their possible targets might be China. The continuing insurgency in Afghanistan also motivates and justifies the Western military presence in the country and strains relations between the Afghan and Pakistani governments, who blame one another for perpetuating the instability along their shared border.

Yet Chinese commentators sometimes blame Western policies for contributing to such extremism, such as pursuing excessively militaristic policies or using inflammatory language. Chinese analysts sometimes concur with their Pakistani colleagues that India is seeking to deepen its presence in Afghanistan to limit Pakistani and Chinese influences there,[60] though little evidence exists that Chinese policymakers accept the views of some Pakistanis that the Afghan Taliban provides a useful instrument for constraining India’s presence in Afghanistan. (The insurgency is one reason why Afghan officials tend to favor India over Pakistan.) A half-century of close collaboration between Chinese and Pakistani security officials gives Beijing sufficient weight in Islamabad to pressure Pakistan’s military and intelligence services to curtail their support for Islamist extremists. In the past, the PRC has used its ties with Pakistan to induce the Pakistani security forces to suppress extremist groups that had attacked Chinese workers in Pakistan or supported Uyghur separatists.[61] But Chinese officials do not want to jeopardize their influence with these important Pakistani actors through excessive pressure, especially when they can again free ride on Washington’s efforts.

In addition to using the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to counter potential terrorist threats against the PRC, Chinese policymakers have supported initiatives to expand the organization’s role regarding Afghanistan. President Hamid Karzai has been a regular guest at SCO summits since 2004 and supported members’ efforts to deepen their engagement in Afghanistan.[62] In November 2005, the members established a SCO-Afghan Working Group to provide a coordinating mechanism for the large number of the organization’s initiatives concerning that country. At the special March 2009 SCO conference on Afghanistan held in Moscow, PRC Deputy Foreign Minister Wu Dawei announced that China would give $75 million in economic and military assistance to Afghanistan during the next five years.[63] The convening of the special SCO conference further confirms the unique status that Afghanistan has obtained within the organization. As Russian President Dmitry Medvedev related at the SCO’s June 2009 leadership summit in Yekaterinburg, “There was not a single speech at our summit that did not mention Afghanistan.”[64]

Thinking Ahead

While Western policymakers focus on winning the ground war in Afghanistan, the PRC is patiently developing a leading presence in important Afghan economic sectors. Having kept out of the vicious combat between NATO and Taliban forces as well as the widely publicized disputes between Karzai and Western governments that marked much of 2009, the PRC is well positioned to resume its traditional policy of dealing with whichever government is in power in Kabul.

Until then, China is most likely to assist the counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan by investing in the country’s raw material sector and helping to develop transportation, communication and other networks that the Chinese could use to better exploit these natural resources. These contributions should be welcomed. They will help divert Afghans away from illicit commercial activities such as opium production. They will also provide additional revenues for an Afghan government struggling to sustain its enormous security establishment, and whose upkeep costs more than the size of the annual gross domestic product. Although NATO advisors are taking the lead in training the Afghan Army, Chinese institutions could do more to educate Afghans in various technical fields beneficial to the country’s economic recovery. Under the provisions of the Aynak copper deal, 60 Afghan students will study engineering in China starting in 2010.[65] With an academic exchange mechanism in place, this figure could easily be expanded. Even if it does not want to send its own military police to Afghanistan, the PRC has the capability to train Afghan police forces—an area in which the EU has encountered difficulty—though perhaps not in the techniques desired by NATO security sector experts.[66]

In seeking additional Chinese economic assistance for Afghanistan (and Pakistan), however, the United States and its allies should address the concerns of development experts and host nations about how PRC companies operate in poorly governed regimes. Many examples exist in neighboring Pakistan as well as elsewhere of how Chinese extractive firms have degraded the environment, brought in Chinese sub-contractors rather than relied on local managers and provoked violent resistance to their operations by local community activists.[67] While welcoming Chinese investment in Afghanistan, Western governments should strive to induce the PRC to make its aide flows more transparent and condition its assistance on the recipients practicing good domestic governance (e.g. civilian control of the military and intelligence services as well as respect for human rights), responsible economic policies (limited state control and domestic subsidies), adherence to world-class ecological standards such as the Equator Principles and World Bank benchmarks (to which MCC pledged to adhere in its bid), opposition to proliferation and terrorism, and conforming to the other requirements typically imposed by international lending agencies (such as transparency and curbs on corruption).

The main weakness in China’s Afghan strategy is its dependence on Western forces to check the Taliban insurgency and establish a secure investment climate in Afghanistan without much security support from Beijing. If NATO efforts fail, the Chinese government could find itself without sufficient means to protect its large and growing economic and geopolitical stake in the country. Beijing’s contingency plan is to prepare to reach an agreement with the Taliban should it regain power in Kabul. The PRC would presumably offer diplomatic and economic relations with the new regime if it did not expropriate Chinese investments in Afghanistan or resume exporting jihadi ideology and terrorists into the PRC. But the success of this fallback strategy depends on the Taliban going along. Chinese representatives will find it hard to escape the dilemma that expanding their commercial presence in Afghanistan will make it difficult for the PRC not to become engaged in Afghan affairs in other ways.

Richard Weitz is senior fellow and director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute.

Notes

[1]   “China and Afghanistan,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Aug. 25, 2003, <http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2676/t15822.htm>.
[2] Preeti Bhattacharji, ‘‘Uighurs and China’s Xinjiang Region,’’ Council on Foreign Relations, July 6, 2009, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/16870/#5>.
[3] Martin I. Wayne, ‘‘Five Lessons from China’s War on Terror,’’ Joint Force Quarterly, No. 47 (4th Quarter 2007), pp. 42-54, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i47/09.pdf>.
[4] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Foreign Ministry Spokesman’s Press Conference,” Nov. 22, 2001, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t14731.htm>.
[5] Chris Buckley, “Chinese Anger and Terror Warnings Cloud Olympics,” Reuters, April 12, 2008, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUKPEK20364920080411?feedType=RSS&feedName=top News>.
[6] “China Thwarted Olympics Attack: State Media,” ABC News, March 9, 2008, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/03/09/2184515.htm>.
[7] Edward Wong, “Arrests Increased in Muslim Region of China,” New York Times, Jan. 5, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/05/world/asia/05iht-06china.19097680.html>.
[8] Testimony of Professor Walid Phares to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on the Impact of China’s Economic and Security Interests in Continental Asia on the United States, Washington, DC, May 20, 2009, <http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2009hearings/transcripts/09_05_20_trans/09_05_20_trans.pdf>.
[9] Zhao Huaheng, “China, Russia, and the United States: Prospects for Cooperation in Central Asia,” CEF Quarterly: The Journal of the China-Eurasia Forum (February 2005), p. 24, at <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/CEF/CEF_Quarterly_Winter_2005.doc.pdf>.
[10] “Opium Poppy Cultivation in South East Asia: Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Dec. 2008, <http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/East_Asia_Opium_report_2008.pdf>.
[11] Li Xiaokun, “Fighting with Challenges for a Better Future,” China Daily, Aug. 21, 2007, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-08/21/content_6034679.htm>.
[12] UNODC, “Annual Report 2009,” p. 96.
[13] John Fox, “Can China Save Afghanistan?” European Council on Foreign Relations, Sept. 29, 2008, <http://www.ecfr.eu/content/entry/can_china_save_afghanistan/>.
[14] “Drug Crime on the Increase in China,” Xinhua, Feb. 25, 2009, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-02/25/content_10897343.htm>.
[15] “Golden Crescent’ Drug Spell Plagues China’s Northwest,” Xinhua, Sept. 1, 2007, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-09/01/content_6644790.htm>.
[16] Stephanie Chen, “Xinjiang Becomes Hub for Central Asia’s Drug Trade: Almost 70 kg of Heroin Seized in Northwest this Year,” South China Morning Post, Sept. 15, 2007.
[17] Lei Xiaoxun and Zhu Zhe, ‘‘Xinjiang Targets Drug Trafficking,’’ China Daily, March 10, 2009. <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-03/10/content_7557566.htm>.
[18] Stephanie Chen, “Xinjiang Becomes Hub for Central Asia’s Drug Trade: Almost 70 kg of Heroin Seized in Northwest this Year,” South China Morning Post, Sept. 15, 2007.
[19] “Afghanistan’s Opium Crisis Undermines Its Long-term Stability,” National Security Network Report, May 13, 2008, <http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/858>.
[20] Ziad Haider, ‘‘Sino-Pakistan Relations and Xinjiang’s Uighurs: Politics, Trade, and Islam along the Karakoram Highway,’’ Asian Survey, 45:4 (July/August 2005), p. 533.
[21] “Chinese President Pledges Support for Afghan Reconstruction,” Xinhua, Aug. 15, 2007, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-08/15/content_6539035.htm>.
[22] “China and Afghanistan,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Aug. 25, 2003, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2676/t15822.htm>.
[23] Nicklas Norling, “The Emerging China-Afghanistan Relationship,” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, May 14, 2008, <http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4858>.
[24] “Trade with Countries and Regions in Asia,” Department of Asian Affairs, Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, <http://yzs2.mofcom.gov.cn/statistic/statistic.html>.
[25] “China Pledges Continued Support to Afghanistan’s Reconstruction,” China View, Aug. 20, 2008, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-08/20/content_6570572.htm>.
[26] Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Mines, “Request for Expression of Interest Aynak Copper Deposit,” <http://www.bgs.ac.uk/afghanMinerals/docs/tenders/Aynak/request_for_EOI_v7a_enGA.pdf>. The $3.5 billion bid offered by the China Metallurgical Group (MCC) for the 30-year lease, far exceeded the sums offered by Russian, American, and other foreign firms. The state-owned MCC could offer a package of benefits that its private sector competitors could not match.
[27] Jonathan S. Landay, “China’s Thirst for Copper Could Hold Key to Afghanistan’s Future,” McClatchy Newspapers, March 8, 2009, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/homepage/story/63452.html>.
[28] Ron Synovitz, “China: Afghan Investment Reveals Larger Strategy,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 29, 2008, <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1144514.html>.
[29] Testimony of Michael Schiffer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia, Department of Defense, to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on the Impact of China’s Economic and Security Interests in Continental Asia on the United States, Washington, DC, May 20, 2009, <http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2009hearings/transcripts/09_05_20_trans/09_05_20_trans.pdf>.
[30] Jonathan S. Landay, “China’s Thirst for Copper Could Hold Key to Afghanistan’s Future,” McClatchy Newspapers, March 8, 2009, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/homepage/story/63452.html>.
[31] Nirav Patel and David Capezza, “From Washington to Kabul to Beijing: Assessing Prospects for U.S.-China-Afghanistan Cooperation,” Small Wars Journal (April 1, 2009), <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/04/assessing-prospects-for-uschin/>.
[32] Nicklas Norling, “The Emerging China-Afghanistan Relationship,” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, May 14, 2008, <http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4858>.
[33] Michael M. Phillips and Shai Oster, “U.S. and China Work Together to Rebuild Afghanistan,” Wall Street Journal, June 20, 2009, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124545705106832957.html>.
[34] Ron Synovitz, “China: Afghan Investment Reveals Larger Strategy,” RFE/RL, May 29, 2008, <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1144514.html>.
[35] “China supports Afghanistan in Reconstruction, Development,” China View, June 13, 2008, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-06/13/content_8357399.htm>.
[36] “China Pledges Continued Support to Afghanistan’s Reconstruction,” China View, Aug. 20, 2008, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-08/20/content_6570572.htm>.
[37] ‘‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference,’’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, July 14, 2009, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t573182.htm>.
[38] China Review News, December 28, 2009, cited in Russell Hsiao and Glen E. Howard, “China Builds Closer Ties to Afghanistan through Wakhan Corridor,” China Brief , Vol. 10, No. 1, Jan. 7, 2010, <http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35879&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=8aeb0ffe75>.
[39] Eltaf Najafizada, “Afghan Taliban Seek Ransom for Two Kidnapped Chinese (Update1),” Bloomberg, Jan. 19, 2010, <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-01-19/afghan-taliban-seek-ransom-payment-for-two-kidnapped-chinese.html>.
[40] “2 Chinese Engineers Kidnapped by Taliban,” China Daily, Jan. 19, 2010.
[41] Andrew Small, “China’s Af-Pak Moment,” German Marshall Fund of the United States Policy Brief, May 20, 2009, p. 3, <http://www.gmfus.org//doc/Small_Af-Pak_Brief_0509_final.pdf>.
[42] Kurt M. Campbell, Nirav Patel, and Richard Weitz, The Ripple Effect: China’s Responses to the Iraq War (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, October 2008).
[43] Testimony of Michael Schiffer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia, Department of Defense, to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on the Impact of China’s Economic and Security Interests in Continental Asia on the United States, Washington, DC, May 20, 2009, <http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2009hearings/transcripts/09_05_20_trans/09_05_20_trans.pdf>.
[44] Richard Weitz, “Managing U.S.-China Crises,” in Richard Weitz, ed., Project on National Security Reform: Case Studies, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Project on National Security Reform, 2008), pp. 254-317.
[45] Andrew Small, “China’s Af-Pak Moment,” Policy Brief, German Marshall Fund of the United States, May 20, 2009, p. 4, <http://www.gmfus.org//doc/Small_Af-Pak_Brief_0509_final.pdf>.
[46] “NATO Overreaching Itself Globally,” Sept. 8, 2006, <http://english.people.com.cn/200609/08/eng20060908_300996.html>.
[47] Chris Buckley, “U.S. Looks to China for Support on Afghanistan: Pentagon,” Reuters, Feb. 28, 2009, <http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCATRE51R0L720090228>.
[48]   “China, US to Try to Cooperate on Pakistan, Afghanistan,” Agence France-Presse, April 16, 2009, <http://www.sinodaily.com/2006/090416092702.e9yjjnjh.html>.
[49]   Ibid.
[50] Andrew Small, “China’s Af-Pak Moment,” Policy Brief, German Marshall Fund of the United States, May 20, 2009, p. 2, <http://www.gmfus.org//doc/Small_Af-Pak_Brief_0509_final.pdf>.
[51]   “U.S.-China Joint Statement,” Office of the White House Press Secretary, Nov. 17, 2009, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-china-joint-statement>.
[52] Liu, Melinda “How Could China Quietly Play a Key Role in Afghanistan,” Newsweek, Dec. 1, 2008, <http://www.newsweek.com/id/170320>.
[53] “China Says Support for NATO Effort Unlikely Now,” New York Times, March 4, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2009/03/04/world/AP-AS-China-NATO-Afghanistan.html>.
[54] “FACTBOX-Key Facts about the Wakhan Corridor,” Reuters, June 12, 2009, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSSP389507>.
[55] Russell Hsiao and Glen E. Howard, “China Builds Closer Ties to Afghanistan through Wakhan Corridor,” China Brief, Vol. 10, No. 1, Jan. 7, 2010, <http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35879&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=8aeb0ffe75>.
[56] Han Dongping, “Say No to NATO Use of the Wahan Corridor,” China Daily, Jan. 15, 2010, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/thinktank/2010-01/15/content_9328913.htm>.
[57] Ibid.
[58] D.S. Rajan, “China: Xinjiang’s Wakhan Corridor As US Base?,” C3S Paper No. 422, Dec. 30, 2009, <http://www.c3sindia.org/india/1122>.
[59] Li Hongmei, “What to do with Afghanistan ?,” People’s Daily Online, Jan. 13, 2010, <http://english.people.com.cn/90002/96417/6867948.html>.
[60] US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2009 Report To Congress (Washington , DC: 2009), p. 213, <http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2009/09report_chapters.php>.
[61] Andrew Small, “China’s Af-Pak Moment,” German Marshall Fund of the United States Policy Brief, May 20, 2009, pp. 1-2, <http://www.gmfus.org//doc/Small_Af-Pak_Brief_0509_final.pdf>.
[62] “Regional Security Summit Vows to Ensure Stability in Asia,” RIA Novosti, Aug. 16, 2007, <http://en.rian.ru/world/20070816/71908472.html>.
[63] ‘‘China Pledges $75 m in Aid for Afghanistan,’’ Xinhua, April 1, 2009, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-04/01/content_7638635.htm>.
[64] Dmitry Medvedev, “News Conference Following Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit,” President of Russia web site, June 16, 2009, <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2009/06/16/2220_type82914type82915_217999.shtml>.
[65] Jonathan S. Landay, “China’s Thirst for Copper Could Hold Key to Afghanistan’s Future,” McClatchy Newspapers, March 8, 2009, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/homepage/story/63452.html>.
[66] For a discussion of the problems the EU is experiencing with its police mission in Afghanistan see: Kim Sengupta, “Nato Will ‘Transform’ Afghan Police Security Failures, The Independent, Jan. 15, 2010, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/nato-will-transform-afghan-police-security-failures-1868603.html>.
[67]   Wines, “China Willing To Spend Big.”